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16

No because if stick force per G is too low, when maneuvering it becomes too easy to pull a lot of G and that's bad. It's like having power brakes in your car that don't build up more resistance in the pedal the harder you brake; it becomes difficult to regulate braking effort and too easy to lock the brakes (assuming no ABS). Like with brakes, it's ...


15

Stripes don't have any standardized meaning in between companies. If a company wanted, it could give one stripe to its most senior captains and four stripes to the office dog. If your employer or your school has issued you a uniform, then the number of stripes that you have is the number of stripes that they decided to put on that uniform. If you haven't ...


13

There are two fairly recent airliner crashes I can think of that were the direct result of an aerodynamic stall, one is Air France 447 and the other is Colgan Air 3407. AF447 was at cruise height when the incident began, so that one does not fit with your question. Colgan3407 was landing, so was pretty much "low level" (Does "jet" permit a turboprop?). ...


9

The problem is that there is no redundancy in the sensor input. The quote from the article is: This original version of MCAS, according to two people familiar with the details, was activated only if two distinct sensors indicated such an extreme maneuver: a high angle of attack and a high G-force. So on the original design, MCAS activation required two ...


8

The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS system is there ONLY to meet the FAA longitudinal stability requirements as specified in FAR Section 25.173, and in particular part (c) which mandates "stick force vs speed curve:, and also FAR Section 25.203 — "Stall characteristics". FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS Sec. 25.173 — Static longitudinal stability. Sec. 25.173 — Static ...


7

The reference of pitch is the horizontal. The reference of AoA is the direction of the relative wind.


6

Of course the airlines knew about MCAS. Do you think the maintenance manuals, maintenance program documents, tech training, wiring diagrams, and all that stuff was left out so it was totally top secret? There would be a controller, wiring and software on board even though there were no cockpit indications or controls, so certainly the techs who might have ...


6

As mentioned in this answer: stick forces are designed into the control feel. The best feedback for the pilots on how large their control input is, is haptic feedback: push/pull force as detected by the force transducers in our hands. While looking out of a cockpit window, we don't exactly know where our hands are, but we don't have to look at our hands to ...


4

Rather than put up with one us speculating and pontificating on what to do, just read this terrific account of the Air Canada Gimli Glider incident, where a '67 did exactly that. They pretty much did it right, helped by a Capt that really knew how to fly as opposed to just being competent at running the machinery.


4

Two other catastrophic accidents during takeoff phase occurred on flight testing for transport category aircraft, though both of them are business jets: 1. Bombardier Challenger 604, 2000, Wichita Aggressive takeoff rotation led to fuel migration and shifted the aircraft CG aft of the allowed limits. The combined effect of the large initial rate of ...


3

From publicly available sources, the first motive of the MCAS was to satisfy the stick force per G requirements, or maneuvering stability (not static longitudinal stability, which deals with speed stability). This is confusingly captured in 14 CFR 25.255(b) and (c) under Out-of-Trim Characteristics, but also applies broadly to buffet characterization at mid/...


3

That's a completely incorrect understanding of the article. The summary should be: MCAS activates if: a) Sensor detects a high angle of attack and b) Sensor detects a high normal G load If one sensor is erroneous and and the other one isn't, then MCAS would not erroneously activate.


3

Several examples on Skybrary One of the most notorious cases is arguably Northwest's MD-82 On 16 August 1987, an MD-82 being operated by Northwest Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Detroit MI to Phoenix AZ failed to get properly airborne in day VMC and, after damaging impact with obstacles within the airport perimeter after climbing to ...


2

Sounds similar to the De Havilland Comet 1's other problem. On 26 October 1952, the Comet suffered its first hull loss when a BOAC flight departing Rome's Ciampino airport failed to become airborne and ran into rough ground at the end of the runway. ... Both early accidents were originally attributed to pilot error, as over-rotation had led ...


2

There are a couple I can think of off-hand from the last couple of decades (in addition to the ones already listed in other answers): 1. National Airlines Flight 102 I suppose whether this one counts depends on exactly what definition of "airliner" you're using. Certainly, the 747-400 is normally considered an airliner, though this was its cargo variant. I ...


2

Angle of attack is the angle between the relative wind and the chord of the wing. Pitch is the angle between the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the horizon. They are related, (and both are controlled with the elevator) but independent of each other. In high speed straight and level flight they are probably the closest to being equal, but generally ...


2

The MAX feels like the NG, which feels like the Classic, which feels like the -200. The flight control artificial forces are identical across the different versions, which share a type rating. No need for MCAS there. Also, the MAX is longitudinally stable. MCAS was implemented for tackling some situations in extreme corners of the flight envelope, as ...


1

No. To people at the airport, the electromagnetic radiation from various sources relating to aviation (or anything else) is not dangerous. Any electromagnetic radiation is, with enough intensity, possibly dangerous, even instantly lethal, but you can rest assured, that such intensities are not present anywhere a normal person has access to.


1

The 1972 crash of BEA flight 548 in Staines, near Heathrow Airport, London, was, and remains, the most lethal flying accident (excluding terrorism) in the UK. It was a significant incident with respect to raising issues of crisis management in the cockpit, and in bringing about the use of cockpit voice recorders. The proximate cause was a decrease in the ...


1

It is wise that controllers alert even when the pilot has not declared an emergency. They have to be prepared and start coordination and assessment of the situation because one situation that is not emergent in the air can turn quickly to a distress one. This does not mean that controllers have to block the frequency and ask every moment. The controllers ...


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