The core of this question and questions like it is based on a misunderstanding of a particular characteristic of the pitch control systems on the 737.
The general notion is that the yoke operates the flight control surfaces and the trim operates the flight adjustment surfaces. This would give the yoke pitch authority beyond that of the trim control, just like in most small aircraft.
On the 737 it's the other way around. The yoke still operates the elevator surfaces like in most other aircraft, but the trim controls adjusts the entire horizontal stabilizer, elevator surfaces and all. This gives the trim control system way more authority over pitch than the yoke, effectively turning it into the flight control system and degrading the yoke to the flight adjustment role.
The only way out of a runaway automated trim is by first disabling that automated trim control system and then manually readjust the trim control surfaces. Switching off the automated trim control system separately is for various reasons not possible. The only way to disable it is by switching off all powered pitch trim control. That includes the trim switch on the yoke. After that the readjustment of trim has to be done by turning the trim wheels ONLY.
At least one of the MAX crashes could have been prevented by simply keeping it that way. The fatal mistake was to repetitively reactivate the powered pitch control, thereby also reactivating the malfunctioning system. This not only makes the problem reoccur, but also makes it increase. That process repeats until the sheer authority of the trim control supersedes that of the elevator and the airplane goes into an unrecoverable dive.
The pressure problem arises as one pilot tries to maintain level flight by pulling the yoke, while the other pilot tries to adjust the trim wheels. These two forces work directly against each other. The harder one pilot pulls, the harder it is for the other to turn the wheel.
The solution is a roller coaster like routine that allows the spinning pilot to briefly adjust the trim wheel as the yoke pulling pilot briefly gives full slack. This decreases the problem with every turn of the wheel. This is by no means easy. Many experienced pilots still have a problem wrapping their head around it in unannounced simulations. It demands almost immediate response to something that occurs completely out of the blue and at first feels like ordinary turbulence.
The core of the story is that flight control input isn't always flight control authority and between automated pitch control and manual pitch control there is the switch on the yoke. It provides powered pitch control, which is neither automated nor manual.
A revealing part of the story is the fact that it shows how a 737,... correction, how any 737 can actually be trimmed straight into the ground. No pilot in his right mind would ever do that, but the intuitive notion that it's impossible is not correct. An intently obscured malfunctioning MCAS replacing a pilot who's not in his right mind proves that.
Meanwhile the impact of the MCAS related crashes continues to ripple through the aviation world. Reason for that is the one thing that everyone agrees on. These crashes should have been absolutely impossible, yet they happened. No NTSB investigation will ever determine the cause. No court case will ever convict those responsible. No FAA rule will keep it from ever happening again. Complacency is not reflective and mere ignorance does not provide closure. There's no excuse for these crashes, like there is no exception to what's impossible.