Don't go by Wikipedia. Read the congressional report on the issue here. Stall comes into the issue in a peripheral way, but it's not what the system itself was addressing. It was addressing behaviour that could nudge the unwary pilot closer to the stall region you might say, but not stall recovery, or behaviour in the stall itself (maybe "nothing whatsoever" is a bit too strong, but it was a secondary issue at minimum).
The main issue was, while doing turns while flaps up and at fairly low speed, the force required to hold the nose attitude while in the turn would go down in a subtle way, and a pilot holding, say, 15lbs of back pressure to maintain the pitch attitude in the turn would notice the nose drifting up without increasing back pressure. Normally, someone paying attention while they were flying would notice this and react with a relaxation of back pressure instinctively, but it was an odd characteristic nonetheless, certainly different from older 737s. The other large issue was the pitch up with thrust was more pronounced than with with older 737s, a result of the same factors.
These sorts of software band aids are not that unusual. The 747-8 actually uses the FBW ailerons, which are normally inactive at high speed, to work as active oscillation dampers to stop the wing tips from shaking up and down at high speed. And whenever you see vortex generators stuck on a wing or tail somewhere, they are usually a physical band aid to fix something found during testing.
The scandal about the MAX is mostly in Boeing's implementation of the band aid.