Timeline for Why does the KC-46 use two sensors for MCAS when the 737 Max doesn’t?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
12 events
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| May 26, 2021 at 13:19 | comment | added | user55607 | @Koyovis Sorry, but that simply does not add up. What consequences AOA failure had on other systems is utterly irrelevant. Regardless of whether that resulted in very few or very many catastrophic failures. It considers components that are not included in the MCAS application, so play no role in its risk assessment. That's like, pretty much any high school graduate should be able to figure that one out. But it doesn't matter. I have found the answer I was looking for in my question, so I'll stop bothering you. Have fun ! | |
| May 26, 2021 at 4:52 | comment | added | Koyovis | @Berend No, failure rate of all the components in the system need to be considered, plus the actions taken when a component fails. System design for functionality, as successfully implemented in the KC-46 MCAS, where AoA sensor fail could be detected, then MCAS switched off and the pilots notified. This was the bit that the MAX did not implement. | |
| May 14, 2021 at 17:29 | comment | added | user55607 | @Koyovis "accumulated flying hours of 250 million had experienced no catastrophic failures due to AoA sensor failure" How does that relate to the use of an AOA sensor for MCAS? Seeing as that MCAS is what makes the result of AOA failure potentially catastrophic, isn't it more realistic to just look at failure rates of the AOA itself? | |
| May 13, 2021 at 12:59 | comment | added | CGCampbell | Two sensors is better, three (or more) would be best. | |
| Jun 17, 2020 at 8:28 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
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| Feb 18, 2020 at 0:27 | comment | added | Koyovis | @FreeMan Thanks for the comment, have improved the phrasing in the answer. | |
| Feb 17, 2020 at 12:15 | comment | added | FreeMan | Ah, that makes more sense. Thank you! | |
| Feb 15, 2020 at 2:09 | history | edited | Koyovis | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Feb 14, 2020 at 22:54 | comment | added | Koyovis | @FreeMan A Catastrophic failure may occur not more than 1 in 10$^9$ flying hours, a Major fail does not have catastrophic consequences per se and is allowed to happen no more than once in 10$^5$ flying hours. | |
| Feb 14, 2020 at 19:33 | vote | accept | George Clooney In a Mooney | ||
| Feb 14, 2020 at 15:16 | comment | added | FreeMan | This may be grounds for a new question. If I'm reading correctly, a failure happening 1 in 10^5 hours is Major, while a failure happening 1 in 10^9 is Catastrophic? How's that? 10^5 is a much smaller number (and therefore much more frequent occurrance) than 10^9. (Or is that a typo?) | |
| Feb 14, 2020 at 11:31 | history | answered | Koyovis | CC BY-SA 4.0 |