Timeline for What is the standard procedure in case of inconsistent sensor readings?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 13, 2017 at 12:59 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://aviation.stackexchange.com/ with https://aviation.stackexchange.com/
|
|
| Jun 12, 2015 at 13:12 | comment | added | Jan Hudec | I don't know about Boeing, but in Airbus ELACs and FACs are only two and only SECs are three, but fault detection does not seem to use cross-checking between them anyway. Instead each unit is a pair of computers, one checking the other. See also aviation.stackexchange.com/a/15262/524. | |
| Jun 12, 2015 at 13:06 | comment | added | Dave | Interesting, my understanding of FWB was that it was also triple redundant but I learn something new every day. | |
| Jun 11, 2015 at 21:53 | comment | added | Jan Hudec | Avionics sensors are, indeed, usually triple-redundant. It does not apply to avionics computers, where the redundancy (for the critical systems like FBW) relies on dissimilar systems instead. | |
| Jun 11, 2015 at 16:41 | history | edited | Dave | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
added 110 characters in body
|
| Jun 11, 2015 at 14:27 | history | answered | Dave | CC BY-SA 3.0 |